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Abstract. The terrorist attacks have highlighted the importance of threats in the cross 
border dimension in regards to the identification of terrorists, the monitoring of ‘subjects 
of interest’ and other terrorism-related actors. The essence of research is determined by 
the dramatic increase of number of terrorists who perpetrated terrorist attacks and had 
used all available modes of transport, including legal and irregular options for crossing 
borders. The aim of the paper is to provide assistance in establishing/strengthening 
identification and profiling mechanisms in order to better distinguish among different 
categories of persons. 
The task of the paper is to analyse risk indicators provided by General Secretariat 
and compare them with European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s developed risk 
indicators in order to provide a support instrument (methodology for the profiling and 
identification of the foreign terrorist fighters (hereinafter – FTF) (hereinafter – the 
Methodology) for risk assessment performed at national level. In order to 
provide additional support for law enforcement agencies (especially for border guards) the 
author of the paper will come up with a  range of recommendations. 
Main conclusion: At the national level, it is necessary to develop the Methodology of 
the FTF. Taking into account Methodology, it is possible to develop a system of risk 
indicators and apply them in practice to prevent irregular migration, trafficking in human 
beings etc.  
Primary methods: content analysis, multidimensional measurement and factor 
analysis. Achieved results: recommendations made by the author of the paper will improve 
the border check procedures regarding identification of FTF. 
 
Keywords: border crossing point, foreign terrorist fighters, indicators, methodology, 
profiling. 
 
Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks which struck Europe over the last years, have 
reinforced on determination to address comprehensively and collectively 
the unprecedented threat posed by FTF. The detection and disruption of 
terrorist travel, both before departure and upon return, has been widely 
recognised as a key priority.  With a view to support the country border 
authorities in their coordinated implementation of the targeted checks the 
European Commission (General Secretariat of the Council) has facilitated a 
process to define common risk indicators. The definition of these common 
risk indicators is to provide a jointly agreed set of particular travel patterns 
and risk criteria.  
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The object of paper: FTF identification methodology. Research period: 
2016 – 2018. Research methods: content analysis, multidimensional 
measurement and factor analysis. 
 
Theoretical overview 
 
Terrorist attacks in Belgium, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, as well as in Turkey, France, Sweden, 
and other countries, have underscored the importance of a transboundary 
dimension with regard to the identification of terrorists, monitoring of 
possible faces of the FTF and other actors related to terrorism. Some of the 
terrorist attacks are committed by persons who has returned from conflict 
zones, and some – by the persons who has never been there. 
If in 2017 terrorist attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) were committed mainly against national and international armed 
forces and security agencies, now their targets are mainly local residents. In 
addition, weak targets, such as the metro station in St. Petersburg, the 
Russian Federation (April 3, 2017), the concert hall in Manchester, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (May 22, 2017). 
These attacks, as a rule, have been simple in execution, but led to numerous 
victims. In some of these acts of terrorism, different means were 
simultaneously used, as in London on March 22 and June 3, when terrorists 
used cars and knives. Terrorists had used the simplest means, following the 
instructions of the late Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani, who began recommending 
such methods as early as in 2014. At the same time in some terrorist 
attacks, for example, in St. Petersburg, Manchester, and Brussels, 
homemade explosive devices were also used. Such devices were used in 
Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016; they were also supposed to be used in 
a number of prevented terrorist attacks that were planned in some 
European countries. 
In Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, ISIL has lost control over all 
remaining urban areas. The group continues to transform into a terror 
organization with a flat hierarchy, with cells and affiliates increasingly 
acting autonomously. The global fight against ISIL will have to focus on the 
threat posed by less visible international networks. The combination of 
“frustrated travellers”, ISIL sympathizers, returnees and relocators poses an 
increased security risk for all states. Attempts by ISIL to infuse money into 
the licit economy in combination with a greater inflow of funds for 
reconstruction of recaptured areas will necessitate adjusted counter 
measures. The flow of FTF has continued to slow, with only individual cases 
being reported. However, the marked reduction of territorial control by ISIL 
in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic will force many FTF to make a choice 
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either to join other groups or to leave the region (return home) (Source: 
UN, 2017). 
Returnees present a different challenge. Returnees generally fall into 
three broad categories (Source: UN, 2015): 
– Returnees, who are disenchanted by ISIL as a group and terrorism as 
an ideology and therefore can potentially be de-radicalized and 
reintegrated; 
– the second, much smaller category includes individuals, who return 
with the specific aim of conducting terror attacks and therefore 
present a high risk to United Nations Organization Member States; 
– the third category is the most difficult to identify as it includes 
individuals who have clearly cut ties with ISIL after being 
disillusioned by ISIL as an organization. However, those individuals 
remain radicalized and are ready to join another terrorist group 
should the opportunity arise. Those individuals present a particular 
challenge as they pose a threat without concrete indications of 
current connections to terrorist groups.  
Who are FTFs? UN Security Council resolution 2178 (September 
2014) states that all UN ‘Member States shall, consistent with international 
human rights law, international refugee law, and international 
humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, 
transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than 
their States of 
residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or 
receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their 
activities’. 
Identifying plus monitoring the travel of known FTFs or ‘subjects of 
interest’ is a challenging task, but these risks can be mitigated by making 
full use of the existing tools, e.g. SIS II, Interpol’s databases, etc. 
Potentially identifying the unknown FTFs or ‘subjects of interest’ is even 
more challenging, both at Border Crossing Points (hereinafter – BCP) and 
between BCPs. Nonetheless, many common risk indicators are relevant for 
both realities. 
BCPs oﬀer authorities with a structured environment for the potential 
identification of FTFs or ‘subjects of interest’. However, the green and blue 
borders pose many additional challenges, particularly given large and 
sustained irregular migration movements. The diﬀerent administrative 
and/or judicial measures taken by EU Member States and Schengen 
Associated Countries could mean that EU-based prospective returnees 
might change their planning/travelling modi operandi. These could include 
illegal border-crossing, document fraud, impostors, nationality swapping or 
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possibly a combination of legal and illegal travel options. The challenges are 
not only on exit or entry, but also transit movements to other ‘theatres of 
jihad’. Border-control authorities’ activities oﬀer the legal, administrative 
and geographical spread to better enhance border and internal security, 
especially in the common challenge of countering terrorism (Source: 
FRONTEX, 2018). 
Following several terrorist attacks in Europe where the perpetrators 
intentionally exploited irregular migratory movements, one cannot fail to 
take the opportunity to see how Member States and Schengen Associated 
Countries can do better to deter, disrupt detect and detain those who want 
to indiscriminately inflict harm to innocent communities and undermine 
Europe’s fundamental values. 
In order to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to 
deter, disrupt, detect and detain, it is necessary to elaborate FTF’ 
identification methodology. The purpose of this Methodology is to serve as 
an aide memoire to the Country border authorities in other words to 
complement the detailed and classified common risk indicators for FTFs. 
The persons falling under this risk assessment shall be systematically 
checked against the databases by border guards at the BCP "first and 
second line check".  The quick reference material provided in this 
Methodology is meant to raise awareness amongst first-line officers and 
increase the probability to identify potential ‘subjects of interest’ and send 
them for detailed second-line checks. 
FRONTEX Agency based on European Commission (General 
Secretariat of the Council) provided Common risk indicators for checks at 
external borders preparing a booklet “Operationalisation of Common Risk 
Indicators”. As a best practice from booklet for national methodology 
development provided by FRONTEX Agency, suggestions on how to better 
spot possible FTFs during border checks should be taken. This booklet is 
structured in accordance with three main stages of border check: before 
person arrives at a BCP, during the first-line check and when a person is 
referred to the second-line checks.  
The indicators and their tentative risk marking are described under 
the separate headings for each of the three stages and are focused on the 
table. When relevant, the direction of the travel is referred to separately as 
is also the type of the border. Each described indicator is also given a 
tentative risk marking (scale from 1–3) with 1 marked yellow and 
indicating (Figure 1): 
- RED – Indication of possible active involvement of the checked 
person in the current ‘theatres of jihad’. If only this indicator is 
present – second-line checks are strongly advised; 
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- ORANGE – Indication of possible active involvement of the checked 
person in the current ‘theatres of jihad’. If this indicator is present 
cumulatively with others – second-line checks are advised 
- YELLOW – Indication of possible deception eﬀorts by the checked 
person. If this indicator is present – the second-line check is advisable 
if a number of these indicators are present. 
 
 
Figure 1. Table of Risk Indicators by FRONTEX Agency  
 
An interesting approach to develop methodology is used by 
FRONTEX, the “Ask Yourself” text boxes are intended to assist the user in 
framing and asking the right questions, while the “Caveat” frames aim to 
warn about certain aspects or practices. The “Inform yourself” and “Check 
it” text boxes are meant to provide the further contextual or detailed 
reading on the relative topic. 
The author of the paper, after summarizing the best practices, has 
understood that, in order to create a methodology, it is necessary to group 
indicators in the following way: 
– First line: 
 route of travel to/from the "country of jihad"; 
 the purpose of the trip to/from the "country of jihad". It is 
necessary to distinguish women (Sex Jihad, “Brides of Allah”, 
“Black widows” approach) and minor border crossing. Separately 
also Terrorist suicide bombers and Couriers should be described 
more detailed; 
 specific characteristics of the traveller crossing the border (or 
group of persons). A number of characteristic features for the 
suicide bomber man and separately for woman; 
 behavior of the person crossing the border (non-verbal 
indicators). Specially could be described a battle weary persons 
and external physical injuries; 
 behavior of the person crossing the border (verbal indicators); 
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 the appearance of a person, visible signs which indicate that the 
person is a radicalised; 
 travel documents used for border crossing; 
 traveller's luggage; 
 known or suspicious methods of movement and vehicles. 
– Second line: 
 details of the purchase of the ticket and payment method; 
 availability of electronic or other storage media and fixation 
devices (machines) and theirs accessories; 
 items in personal belongings that cause a certain interest; 
 documents, causing some interest  (suspicions). 
To collect such kind of the indicators, it would be necessary to 
strengthen international, regional, and sub-regional cooperation, if 
appropriate, through multilateral and bilateral agreements. The aims of this 
cooperation are: 
– to facilitate the identification of the threat posed by FTF and prevent 
them from planning, organizing and committing terrorist acts, or 
recruiting and inciting other persons to commit such acts; 
– to prevent the undetected travel of FTF from or through their 
territories, especially returning and relocating FTF, expanding the 
exchange of information in informal (through appropriate channels) 
and official order for the purposes of identifying FTF, sharing best 
practices and adopting such practices as well as  exploring the routes 
of travel of the FTF and their family members. 
In the opinion of the author, today it is necessary not only to establish 
and improve cooperation between law enforcement authorities, but also to 
strengthen the dialogue and cooperation in fighting against terrorism with 
the private sector, regional organizations, structures, companies and 
educational institutions. It is necessary to explore the possibility, where 
appropriate, of applying advanced practical methods in combatting 
terrorism, taking into account specific conditions, in particular in the 
collection of digital data and evidence in cases related to terrorism and FTF. 
Taking into account the specifics and peculiarities of specialized 
groups (persons) crossing the border, at the national level, it is necessary to 
create the working groups that will  develop the methodology relevant to a 
particular country, by adding description of possible profiles and the list of 
forbidden organisations, groups and etc. 
One of the main problems that working groups may face: national 
level of secrecy regarding the official use of intelligence data concerning 
threats posed by FTF and individual terrorists as well as their travel routes 
and travel related details and in the defined order provide such information 
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domestically to front – line screeners, such as immigration, customs and 
border security agencies and to share good practices in this regard.  
Taking the methodology as fundamentals will allow developing a 
system of risk indicators and applying them in practice to prevent irregular 
migration, drug, tobacco, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, etc. The 
system of risk indicators according to the methodology in comparison to 
the ability to prevent irregular migration and smuggling attached at paper’s 
(Table 1). 
FRONTEX Agency available assessments confirm that there is "no 
clear profile" of the European FTF. The common risk indicators do not aim 
to define such a profile, but to establish a list of patterns and criteria on the 
basis of the best available information with a view to support relevant 
authorities performing border checks. Furthermore, the list of indicators 
shall be revised and tailored to the evolution of the threat posed by the FTF 
phenomenon. 
 
Table 1. The risk indicator system comparison table  
(Source: compiled by the author) 
 
 Indicators FTF 
Irregular 
migration 
Smuggling 
Border checks at the BCP "First line" 
1  Route of travel       
2 The purpose of the trip       
3 Specific characteristics of the 
traveller 
      
4 Behaviour of the person  
(non-verbal indicators) 
      
5 Behaviour of the person 
(verbal indicators) 
      
6 The appearance of a person, 
visible signs 
      
7 Travel documents       
8 Traveller’s luggage       
9 Known or suspicious methods 
of movement and vehicles 
      
Border checks at the BCP "Second line" 
1 Details of the purchase of the 
ticket and payment method 
      
2 Availability of electronic or 
other storage media and 
fixation devices (machines) and 
      
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theirs accessories 
3 Items in personal things that 
cause a certain interest 
      
4 Documents, causing some 
interest 
      
 
With the help of risk indicators, it is possible to improve risk analysis 
system. It is necessary to ensure structural units which are involved in 
border control with established methodology. In a case new indicators will 
be identified, it is necessary with early warning (rapid alert) systems; 
deliver it in time to all involved structures including to/from neighbouring 
countries. 
In order to improve officials` skills, knowledge and competences in 
the field of FTF identification and profiling techniques, it is necessary to 
organize training (workshops) using Methodology’s risk indicators as well 
as to include these topics in education programmes of training institutions. 
Especially, subjects related to the work with victims of terrorism, suspects, 
accused or convicted of violating the law and especially children deprived 
of their liberty, as well as with children who are victims or witnesses of 
crimes. To improve officials` skills, knowledge and competences in the field 
of profiling, it is necessary: 
– to create methodology on human psychology (i.e. facial mimicry and 
body language (signs of lies) and to ensure its application within 
border checks;  
– to foster the implementation of “5W” interviewing methodology as 
well as to elaborate the questionnaires (use the prepared forms of 
questions) for travellers in cases when:   
 border guard doesn’t speak the necessary language (to find out 
whether the traveller knows general facts related to his country of 
origin); 
 the traveller shows misappropriated documents (traveller is 
prepared in advance for questioning) and to ensure its application 
within border checks; 
– to improve the level of professional competences and the general 
understanding of border guards` activities and procedures carried out 
during border checks of documents, vehicles, items, the paper author 
recommends to organize the planned joint exercises (trainings) and 
competitions on professional preparation which could include not only 
the test on knowledge in  the checking of travellers and their 
documents and detention of trespassers, but also  tasks related to 
identification, forged documents and interviewing travellers (also in a 
foreign language); 
100 
 
– at BCP it would be necessary to work out the most common types of 
travellers with the aim to detect the violators. 
 
Conclusions and suggestions 
 
The author of the paper recommends the implementation of profiling 
techniques which envisage the establishment of effective system that does 
not require investment of significant financial resources which in turn is an 
absolute advantage facing the system which is based only on the use of 
expensive equipment instead of human resources.   
The development of methodology, its constant updating and 
appropriate training of personnel on how to use and interpret it correctly 
can increase the chance to prevent the possible terrorist acts in the future. 
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